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THE TITLE IX PENDULUM: TAKING STUDENT SURVIVORS
ALONG FOR THE RIDE
Keeley B. Gogul

I. INTRODUCTION
Sexual harassment and assault on college campuses has been and
remains a prevalent problem. In a recent large survey of a select group of
top universities by the Association of American Universities, more than
181,000 students submitted responses to a wide range of questions
regarding sexual assault and harassment on campus.1 A disturbing 41.8%
of those students reported experiencing at least one sexually harassing
behavior since beginning college, and 18.9% reported “sexually harassing
behavior that either ‘interfered with their academic or professional
performance,’ ‘limited their ability to participate in an academic
program,’ or ‘created an intimidating, hostile or offensive social,
academic or work environment.’”2 Further compounding the severity of
this problem is the tendency of survivors of sexual violence to underreport these incidents.3 One way the federal government and courts have
tried to address incidents of sexual harassment and sexual assault at
educational institutions is through Title IX of the Education Amendments
of 1972 (“Title IX”).4
Title IX was enacted to eliminate discrimination on the basis of sex by
any school or university that receives federal funds.5 A discrimination on
the basis of sex claim can arise in a variety of ways under Title IX,
including as a result of sex-based harassment or assault.6 The Office for
Civil Rights (“OCR”) enforces Title IX by evaluating, investigating, and
resolving complaints regarding sex discrimination.7 The OCR also
routinely issues guidance documents to assist schools and universities

1. David Cantor et al., Report on the AAU Campus Climate Survey on Sexual Assault and
Misconduct, ASS’N. OF AM. UNIVS (January 17, 2020), https://www.aau.edu/sites/default/files/AAUFiles/Key-Issues/Campus-Safety/Revised%20Aggregate%20report%20%20and%20appendices%2017_(01-16-2020_FINAL).pdf.
2. Id. at xlll.
3. Id. at A7-92. In this survey, only 14.1 % of female survivors reported their experience of
sexually harassing behavior to an available program or resource. The reporting rates were even lower for
men (8.3%) and were slightly higher for LGBTQ students (21%).
4. OFF. FOR CIV. RTS., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., Title IX and Sex Discrimination (Aug. 2021),
https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/tix_dis.html [hereinafter
Title IX and Sex
Discrimination].
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
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who receive federal funds in complying with Title IX regulations.8 In
addition, Title IX provides a private right of action against schools that
can be brought by students (or by parents on behalf of students) who are
victims of sexual misconduct that occurs at school.
Despite mechanisms by both the OCR and the courts, enforcement
remains erratic, and school liability for Title IX infractions is not
guaranteed. Part of the problem lies in the pendulum swing of
enforcement as various Presidents’ administrations have expanded and
contracted Title IX, changing the various harms for which students can
recover and the rules governing how the Title IX regulations should be
applied. Another contributing factor is the lower courts’ inconsistent
application of both the Title IX regulations themselves and the Supreme
Court’s Title IX precedents. The main reason for this inconsistency is the
variation in guidance documents issued by the OCR under different
administrations. While these guidance documents are not considered
binding, courts do consider them when interpreting and applying the law.9
Thus, when a new administration significantly expands or contracts
survivors’ rights via new guidance, courts react accordingly. As the OCR
guidance changes, it falls in and out of alignment with Supreme Court
Title IX precedents and further complicates the lower courts’ task of
interpreting and applying Title IX fairly and equitably.10
In 2018, the Trump Administration announced its intention to
promulgate an updated version of the Title IX regulations governing
sexual conduct in accordance with rules set forth in the Administrative
Procedure Act; the resulting regulations went into effect in August of
2019 and, unlike the OCR’s guidance documents, are legally binding.11
However, the Biden Administration quickly ensured another pendulum
swing, issuing an Executive Order in March of 2021 calling for a 100-day
review of any Trump administration rules—including the new Title IX
regulations— that may be inconsistent with Biden’s policy that “all
students should be guaranteed an educational environment free from . . .
discrimination in the form of sexual harassment, which encompasses
sexual violence, and including discrimination on the basis of sexual

8. Id.
9. JARED P. COLE & CHRISTINE J. BLACK, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45685, TITLE IX AND SEXUAL
HARASSMENT: PRIVATE RIGHTS OF ACTION, ADMINISTRATIVE ENFORCEMENT, AND PROPOSED
REGULATIONS 24 n.206 (April 12, 2019), https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20190412_R45685_
28b03082805d893c209321e8cc208b7c72bd2d31.pdf.
10. Id. at Summary.
11. R. Shep Melnick, Analyzing the Department of Education’s Final Title IX Rules on Sexual
Misconduct, BROOKINGS INST. (June 11, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/research/analyzing-thedepartment-of-educations-final-title-ix-rules-on-sexual-misconduct/.
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orientation or gender identity.”12
Part II of this Article reviews the legislative and judicial history of Title
IX, including the key Supreme Court decisions that established the
doctrinal framework as well as lower court decisions that further
contributed to Title IX’s interpretation and application. Part II then
illustrates how these compounding factors worked together to deny a
student survivor recovery in a recent Sixth Circuit case, setting up a circuit
split that turns on how broadly courts interpret the sweep of Title IX itself.
Part III discusses shortcomings of the Sixth Circuit opinion that renders
the narrow standard inapposite and calls for the courts to interpret Title
IX’s reach broadly, especially in light of the next seemingly inevitable
pendulum swing.
II. BACKGROUND
This Part reviews the legislative and judicial history of Title IX,
including the Obama Administration’s guidance documents that
expanded Title IX coverage in an effort to curb rampant sexual
harassment and assault on college campuses and the Trump
Administration’s subsequent withdrawal of those same documents. Next,
this Part summarizes the new regulations enacted by the Trump
Administration and briefly considers arguments for and against them as
well as litigation challenging them. Last, this Part explains the circuit split
that arose as a result of the courts’ different interpretations of Title IX
Supreme Court precedent.
A. Title IX
1. History
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 ensures that education
programs or activities that receive federal funding protect participants in
those programs from discrimination on the basis of sex.13 Title IX covers
both discrimination itself and retaliation against people who object to
discriminatory practices or report incidents of actual discrimination.14
Since its enactment, Title IX has been interpreted by both the courts and
by ongoing guidance documents published over the years by the
Department of Education (“DOE” or “Department”).
Guidance published by the DOE during the Obama Administration
12. Exec. Order No. 14021, 86 Fed.
https://www.federalregister.gov/d/2021-05200/p-2.
13. Title IX and Sex Discrimination, supra note 4.
14. Id.

Reg.

13803
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expanded the coverage of Title IX in several ways. In April of 2011, the
DOE Office of Civil Rights (“OCR”) issued the Dear Colleague Letter
Regarding Sexual Violence, which expressly stated that Title IX’s
provisions covering sexual harassment extended to sexual violence and
addressed the issue of consent in the context of Title IX claims of studenton-student sexual harassment.15 That document provided information on
schools’ obligation to investigate and address sexual violence claims
under Title IX.16
In April of 2014, OCR published a follow-up document entitled
Questions and Answers About Title IX and Sexual Violence (“Q & A
Document”).17 The Q & A Document clarified prior guidance documents
and included examples of ways for schools to proactively address and
prevent sexual violence.18 It also affirmed that Title IX’s coverage
extended to discrimination related to “gender identity or failure to
conform to stereotypical notions of masculinity or femininity” and stated
that a school was obligated to respond to sexual violence involving LGBT
students using the “same procedures and standards” applied to claims by
non-LGBT students.19 Finally, the Q & A Document stated that
transgender students are protected under Title IX.20
In January of 2017, the OCR further clarified its Title IX guidance
regarding transgender students in its Letter to Emily Prince.21 The letter
reiterated the protections included in the Q & A Document and
specifically stated that “[w]hen a school elects to separate or treat students
differently on the basis of sex…a school generally must treat transgender
students consistent with their gender identity.”22 In 2016, the OCR’s Dear
Colleague Letter on Transgender Students further explained schools’
obligations to extend Title IX’s protections for transgender students.23
Taken collectively, these more inclusive Obama-era guidance documents
were widely understood to have held schools to a higher standard and
15. OFF. FOR CIV. RTS. , U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., Dear Colleague Letter: Sexual Violence
Background, Summary, and Fast Facts, (April 4, 2011), https://www2.ed.gov/about/
offices/list/ocr/docs/dcl-factsheet-201104.html.
16. Id.
17. OFF. FOR CIV. RTS., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., Questions & Answers About Title IX and Sexual
Violence, (April 29, 2014), https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/qa-201404-title-ix.pdf
[hereinafter Questions & Answers].
18. Id. at ii.
19. Id. at 5.
20. Id.
21. OFF. FOR CIV. RTS., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., Letter to Emily Prince, (Jan. 7, 2015),
https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/20150107-title-ix-prince-letter.pdf.
22. Id. at 2; see also Questions & Answers, supra note 17 at 5.
23. See OFF. FOR CIV. RTS., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., Dear Colleague Letter on Transgender
Students, (May 13, 2016), https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201605-title-ixtransgender.pdf.
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were “tremendously effective” at making schools more attentive to sexual
misconduct on their campuses.24 However, in 2017, the Trump
Administration began withdrawing the Obama Administration guidance
documents, as well as others, in preparation for new Title IX regulations
regarding sexual misconduct promulgated according to the
Administrative Procedures Act.25 In the wake of these withdrawals, many
colleges announced they plan to continue to abide by the Obama
documents.26
In May of 2020, the Department of Education published new
regulations intended to provide additional clarity to the Department’s
current and past guidance, and to elucidate precise, legally binding
requirements to ensure recipients of federal funding remain in compliance
with Title IX’s regulatory mandates.27 The new regulations were issued
after an extensive comment period that yielded over 124,000 comments
from various stakeholders and went into effect in August of 2020.28
2. Gebser/Davis Framework
The regulations adopt and adapt existing Supreme Court Title IX
jurisprudence into what the Department calls the Gebser/Davis
framework,29 which is used to determine when a school’s response to
sexual harassment is discriminatory such that Title IX is implicated.30 The
Department identified three relevant parts to the Gebser/Davis
framework: “a definition of actionable sexual harassment, the school’s
actual knowledge, and the school’s deliberate indifference.”31 Using its
statutory authority to promulgate the rule necessary to effectuate Title IX,
the Department expanded and adapted the framework to suit the purposes
of administrative enforcement.
Under the adapted Gebser/Davis framework, the new regulations
define “sexual harassment” as “severe, pervasive, and objectively
24. Sarah Brown, What Does the End of Obama’s Title IX Guidance Mean for Colleges?,
CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUC. (Sep. 22, 2017), https://www.chronicle.com/article/what-does-the-end-ofobamas-title-ix-guidance-mean-for-colleges.
25. Melnick, supra note 11. For a complete list of Title IX guidance documents rescinded by
Trump, see OFF. FOR CIV. RTS., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., Rescinded Policy Guidance (Aug. 16, 2021),
https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/frontpage/faq/rr/policyguidance/respolicy.html.
26. Brown, supra note 24.
27. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities Receiving Federal
Financial Assistance, 85 Fed. Reg. 30026, 30029 (May 19, 2020) (codified at 34 C.F.R. Part 106).
Although issued on May 19, 2020, the Department of Education stated that the new regulations have an
effective date of August 14, 2020, due to the COVID-19 pandemic.
28. Id. at 30044.
29. Id. at 30032.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 30033.
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offensive conduct” and also incorporate quid pro quo harassment and the
Clery Act/VAWA offenses of sexual assault, dating violence, domestic
violence, and stalking under the umbrella of sexual harassment.32 In doing
so, the Department explicitly recognized that a single act of sexual
harassment may be sufficiently severe enough to effectively deny the
survivor33 “equal access to an education program or activity,” thus
implicating Title IX.34
Next, the final regulations adopted the Gebser/Davis “actual
knowledge” standard because, under Title IX, it is the funding recipient’s
discriminatory conduct that triggers liability, and “the recipient cannot
commit its own misconduct unless the recipient first knows of sexual
harassment that needs to be addressed.”35 Departing from the concepts of
vicarious liability (respondeat superior), constructive notice, and the
“knows or should have known” standard upon which previous guidance
documents relied, the Department expressly describes the categories of
employees to whom notice will constitute actual knowledge, thus
triggering the recipient’s response under Title IX.36 For elementary and
secondary schools, notice to any employee serves as actual knowledge
under the Gebser/Davis framework, while for postsecondary institutions,
actual knowledge is only triggered by notice to the Title IX Coordinator
or any official with authority “to institute corrective measures on behalf
of the recipient.”37 The Department differentiates between elementary and
secondary schools and postsecondary schools in order to accommodate
younger students’ inability to determine which employees would have a
duty to report and which would not, and respects older students’ rights to
choose to confide in an employee who would have the option of keeping
the disclosure confidential.38 Finally, under the new regulations, a
recipient’s response is triggered whenever an appropriate employee
receives actual notice, regardless of whether it is the complainant or a
third party reporting the alleged sexual harassment.39
The final part of the Gebser/Davis framework addresses the adequacy
of a recipient’s response once actual notice has been received. According
to the Supreme Court, a school acts with deliberate indifference “only
when it responds to sexual harassment in a manner that is ‘clearly
32. Id. at 30036.
33. The Title IX statute and court cases interpreting it generally use the term “victim” when
referring to individuals who have experienced sexual harassment. The author prefers the empowering
language of “survivor” and will use that word in place of “victim” throughout this Casenote.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 30038.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 30039-40.
38. Id.
39. Id.
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unreasonable in light of the known circumstances.’”40 The Department
sets out specific requirements that recipients must satisfy to avoid running
afoul of Title IX by acting with deliberate indifference; a recipient’s
response:
must be prompt; must consist of offering supportive measures to a
complainant; must ensure that the Title IX Coordinator contacts each
complainant to discuss supportive measures, consider the complainant’s
wishes regarding supportive measures, inform the complainant of the
availability of supportive measures with or without the filing of a formal
complaint, and explain to the complainant the process for filing a formal
complaint.41

Additionally, the regulations compel recipients to treat complainants
and respondents equitably, including providing due process protections to
each party and refraining from restricting respondent’s access to
educational programs or activities until a fair investigation and
adjudication process is completed.42 The regulations allow a recipient to
remove a respondent from classes or other school activities on an
emergency basis, with the caveat that an emergency removal will be
subject to the deliberate indifference standard (in order to ascertain
whether the recipient discriminated against the respondent by restricting
access to educational programs or activities).43
Other due process protections are also expressly included in the new
regulations. For example, recipients must provide written notice of the
allegations to both parties, provide both the complainant and respondent
equal opportunities to present facts, expert witnesses, and other
inculpatory and exculpatory evidence, and allow for cross examination
according to specific procedures delineated in the regulations.44
Specifically, at the postsecondary level “a live hearing with crossexamination conducted by the parties’ advisors” is required, while at the
elementary and secondary school level, parties must have an equal
opportunity “to submit written questions for the other parties and
witnesses to answer” before reaching a final conclusion as to
responsibility.45 In order to avoid survivors having to come face-to-face
with respondents, the new regulations allow the required cross
examination process at the postsecondary level to occur with the parties
in separate rooms facilitated by technology.46
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Id. at 30043-44.
Id. at 3044.
Id. at 30044-45.
Id. at 30046.
Id. at 30053-54.
Id.
Id. at 30270.
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In issuing these final regulations and standardizing the legal processes,
the Department of Education intended to “better align the Department’s
Title IX regulations with the text and purpose of Title IX, the U.S.
Constitution, Supreme Court precedent and other case law and address
the practical challenges facing students, employees, and recipients with
respect to sexual harassment allegations in education programs and
activities.”47 The new regulations went into effect on August 14, 2020 and
were ushered in by wide-ranging criticisms and a series of lawsuits.
3. Litigation
As of July 2020, four lawsuits had been filed in response to the new
Title IX regulations, and twenty-five major higher education associations
had asked the Department of Education to extend the deadline for
compliance.48 Colleges and universities cited the length and complexity
of the new regulations as reasons for a more lenient deadline, and eighteen
state attorneys general filed a motion to block the regulations entirely,
arguing that the August 14th deadline causes “immediate and irreparable
harm” to these institutions.49
Collectively, the lawsuits challenged the regulations on multiple
grounds. The American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”) filed suit on
behalf of several organizations that advocate for survivors of sexual
assault and for gender equity, arguing that the new regulations are
discriminatory on their face, and “collectively create a separate standard
for sex discrimination [compared to the standard for discrimination on the
basis of race and national origin].”50 Specifically, the ACLU suit
addressed a change in the wording in the new definition of sexual
harassment, which had previously been defined, in relevant part, as
conduct that is “severe, pervasive, or objectively offensive.”51 According
to the ACLU, the change from “or” to “and” in the new definition means
that single occurrences of sexual harassment are less likely to trigger an
investigation by the school.52 The ACLU suit also pointed out that the
standard for determining discriminatory conduct on the basis of race or
national origin remains severe, pervasive, or objectively offensive, thus
creating a more stringent standard for victims of sexual harassment than

47. Id. at 30030.
48. Greta Anderson, Legal Challenges on Many Fronts, INSIDE HIGHER EDUC. (July 13, 2020),
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2020/07/13/understanding-lawsuits-against-new-title-ixregulations.
49. Id.; Pennsylvania v. DeVos, 480 F. Supp. 3d 47 (D.D.C. Aug. 12, 2020).
50. Anderson, supra note 48.
51. Id. (emphasis added).
52. Id. (emphasis added).
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for other types of discrimination.53 The State of New York echoed this
concern in its lawsuit, citing the procedural incongruity created by the
separate standard.54
The National Women’s Law Center (“NWLC”) took aim at what it
calls “increased protections” for alleged sex offenders.55 In a suit filed in
Massachusetts on behalf of advocacy groups and survivors of sexual
assault, the NWLC argued that the added requirements of live hearings
and mandatory cross examinations unfairly favors respondents, as does
giving colleges the option to use a “clear and convincing” standard of
evidence.56 The NWLC’s concerns echo those of other advocates for
survivors who fear the new requirements will have a chilling effect on
reporting because of the potential that the process will be retraumatizing
for survivors.57
All of the lawsuits also challenged the new regulations on procedural
grounds, claiming that the new regulations are “arbitrary and capricious”
and thus run afoul of the Administrative Procedure Act.58 A similar
procedural fault raised by the suits is that some parts of the regulations
were changed after the public comment period; thus these regulations
violate the Administrative Procedure Act’s requirement that proposed
regulations are made available for public comment.59 Had the courts ruled
in favor of the plaintiffs on this issue, the DOE would have been required
to justify why changes were necessary in the first place, and, importantly,
why the new regulations are superior to ones previously enforced under
Title IX.60 However, as of October 2020, the district courts had denied all
of the plaintiffs’ motions for preliminary injunctions or stays, finding that
the plaintiffs were not likely to succeed on the merits of their APA
claims.61
Despite these criticisms, some proponents of the new regulations
applaud what they claim are enhanced free speech and due process
protections. Supporters of the new regulations claim that the revised
definition of sexual harassment and the new hearing procedures are

53. Id.; see also Know Your IX v. DeVos, No. RDB-20-01224, 2020 WL6150935 (D. Md. Oct.
20, 2020) (dismissed without prejudice for lack of standing).
54. Anderson, supra note 48.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Brett A. Sokolow, OCR is About to Rock Our Worlds, INSIDE HIGHER ED. (Jan. 15, 2020),
https://www.insidehighered.com/views/2020/01/15/how-respond-new-federal-title-ix-regulations-beingpublished-soon-opinion.
58. Anderson, supra note 48.
59. Id. (emphasis added).
60. Id.
61. Pennsylvania v. DeVos, 480 F. Supp. 3d 47, 69; New York v. U.S. Dep’t. of Educ., 477 F.
Supp. 3d 279, 288 (S.D.N.Y. 2020).
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necessary in order to preserve First Amendment rights, arguing that “a
huge amount of speech [has been] silenced in the name of preventing
sexual violence.”62 These organizations argue that the Davis standard
articulated in the new regulations is not only the right one, but that it is
“constitutionally required.”63 Three organizations that support free speech
on campus, Foundation for Individual Rights in Education, Speech First,
and Independent Women’s Law Center, have petitioned to intervene in
the ACLU’s lawsuit, stating that colleges have a long history of using
“bogus” definitions of sexual harassment to chill speech that some find
offensive but that is necessarily protected by the First Amendment.64
Arguments made in favor of the more stringent due process protections
afforded by the new regulations point to the fact that Title IX is intended
to protect all students, not just complainants. 65 Supporters believe the
enhanced due process requirements will ensure equitable treatment of
both complainant and respondent and eliminate alleged “institutional
bias” in favor of survivors.66
Despite the ongoing controversies and legal challenges—as well as the
pending review by the Biden Administration—the new Title IX
regulations are in effect and applicable to discrimination and harassment
claims currently pending before the courts. The next Section explores the
development of pre- and post-harassment claims under Title IX.
B. Developing the Doctrine: Post-Assault/Harassment Claims
One of the primary cases relied on in the promulgation of the new Title
IX regulations also grounds the development of the pre- and postharassment claims doctrine. The 1999 Davis decision was the source of
the “severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive” standard codified in the
new regulations and also marked the first time the Supreme Court
interpreted the scope of deliberate indifference.67 The case arose as a postassault claim alleging ongoing incidents of sexual harassment suffered by
the plaintiff, Davis, at the hands of a fellow student and the failure of the
school board to remedy the situation.68 The issue before the Court was
62. Anderson, supra note 48.
63. FOUNDATION FOR INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS IN EDUCATION, Campus free speech orgs seek to
intervene in lawsuit to defend new Title IX regulations (June 24, 2020), https://www.thefire.org/campusfree-speech-orgs-seek-to-intervene-in-lawsuit-to-defend-new-title-ix-regulations/.
64. Id.
65. Joe Cohn, New Title IX Regulations Carefully Balance the Rights of All Students, FIRE
NEWSDESK (May 8, 2020), https://thefire.org/new-title-ix-regulations-carefully-balance-the-rights-of-allstudents/.
66. Id.
67. Davis. v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 633 (1999).
68. Id.
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whether a private action for damages was permissible against the school
board in cases of student-on-student harassment.69 The Supreme Court
granted cert to resolve a circuit split on this matter and, analogizing these
facts to its earlier opinion in Gebser,70 found that schools could be liable
for damages in cases of peer-on-peer sexual harassment under Title IX
when certain elements were met.71
1. Substantial Control
In considering whether the school district could be held liable for
damages under Title IX for the ongoing peer harassment Davis suffered,
the Court first looked to the amount of control the school had over the
situation, noting that Title IX’s plain language limits the scope of its
coverage to instances where the funding recipient had the requisite degree
of control over both the harasser and the context in which the harassment
occurred.72 Here, the harassment occurred during school hours and on
school grounds, a situation where the school had “substantial control”
over both the situation and the harasser himself.73
2. Degree of Harassment
With the element of control satisfied, the Court next considered the
degree of harassment suffered by Davis, noting that student-on-student
harassment must be “sufficiently severe” in order to be actionable under
Title IX.74 The Court established the standard that is now codified in the
2020 Title IX regulations: the harassment must be “severe, pervasive, and
objectively offensive” such that it denies the survivor “equal access to the
school’s resources and opportunities.”75 In this case, the ongoing
harassment and the precipitous decline in Davis’s grades satisfied the
Court that Davis suffered from such harassment.
3. Actual Knowledge
In addition to these first two elements, the Davis Court held that the

69. Id.
70. Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 290 (1989) (holding that recipients of
federal funding can be liable in damages for teacher-on-student harassment only if the school’s own
deliberate indifference caused the discrimination).
71. Davis, 526 U.S. at 629.
72. Id. at 644.
73. Id. at 645.
74. Id. at 650.
75. Id. at 652.
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school must have had actual knowledge of the harassment,76 and the
school’s response to it must have been deliberately indifferent such that
the response was “clearly unreasonable in light of the known
circumstances.”77 The Court stressed the fact that the deliberate
indifference standard does not mean that schools can only avoid Title IX
liability by completely ridding their schools of peer harassment or that
Title IX mandates particular disciplinary action on the part of the school.78
But in cases where the school’s failure to respond to alleged student-onstudent harassment within a reasonable amount of time may support a
claim that the school’s deliberate indifference subjected the survivor to
discrimination, the Court held that the claim should survive a motion to
dismiss and the finder of fact should determine if the school’s response
was “clearly unreasonable in light of the known circumstances.”79
4. Deliberate Indifference
Finally, the Court explained that deliberate indifference only functions
to provide direct liability under Title IX when such indifference
“subjects” a student to harassment.80 Relying on the plain meaning of the
text, the Court consulted dictionary definitions of the verb “subject” and
concluded that “deliberate indifference must, at minimum, cause students
to undergo harassment or make them liable or vulnerable to it.”81 In other
words, the combination of a recipient’s control of the harasser, the context
in which the harassment occurs, and the school’s deliberate response must
“expose its students to harassment” or “cause them to undergo it” for
liability to attach.82 As discussed later, the Davis Court’s definition of
“subject” becomes the pivotal issue in the eventual circuit split regarding
the appropriate standard required to state a post-assault harassment claim
under Title IX.
C. Developing the Doctrine: Pre-Assault/Harassment Claims
The existence of a pre-assault claim for damages under Title IX is
illustrated in Simpson v. University of Colorado, a case where the court
determined that the University could be held liable for a policy that failed
76. Id. at 650; for a discussion of actual knowledge under the Title IX regulations in effect at the
time, see Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274 (1989); see also Franklin v. Gwinnett Cty.
Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 74-75 (1992).
77. Davis, 526 U.S. at 648.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 649.
80. Id. at 644.
81. Id. at 645 (internal quotations omitted).
82. Id.
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to prevent the likelihood of sexual assault.83 Simpson concerned a
University-run athletic recruitment program wherein high school football
players were invited to campus and hosted by undergraduate students who
were instructed to show them “a good time.”84 The plaintiffs alleged that
they were survivors of multiple sexual assaults that occurred as a result of
recruits’ participation in this University program.85
First, the court found that the actual notice standard established by
Gebser and Davis were inapplicable to this case because the University
itself, via its recruitment policy, was the wrongdoer.86 Analyzing the
University’s culpability for an intentional violation of Title IX under the
standards from Gebser and Davis, the court found that a policy of
deliberate indifference that resulted in a failure to “provid[e] adequate
training or guidance” for a University program satisfied the necessary
elements of “control over the harasser and the environment in which the
harassment occurs” as stated in Title IX; it thus constituted a violation of
the statute.87 The court took note of its earlier decisions in two cases
relating to failure-to-train and noted that the court had explicitly preserved
the possibility that evidence of a single violation of federal rights,
combined with a failure-to-train for the possibility of such a violation,
was sufficient to trigger liability.88 Ultimately, the court held that the
school’s policy of showing football recruits a “good time” combined with
its failure to train hosting students amounted to an ongoing policy of
deliberate indifference that made its female students vulnerable to
harassment when they attended the parties that were part of the University
recruitment process.89
In 2020, the Ninth Circuit issued a decision, relying on Gebser, Davis,
and Simpson, that further refined what elements were necessary for Title
IX claims to survive a motion to dismiss.90 The Karasek case involved
both pre- and post-assault Title IX claims by three students at the
University of California (“UC”). The court held that the following five
elements from Davis were necessary to establish a post-assault claim: (1)
the school must have “exercise[d] substantial control over both the

83. Simpson v. Univ. of Colo. Boulder, 500 F.3d 1170 (10th Cir. 2007).
84. Id. at 1173.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1178-9.
87. Id. at 1178.
88. Id. at 1179, see Bd. of the Cty. Comm. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397 (1997) (holding that a sheriff’s
isolated failure to adequately screen a potential employee did not establish deliberate indifference to the
risk that the employee would use excessive force in the line of duty, but preserving the possibility that
failure-to-train for recurring situations could trigger municipal liability in the event of a single violation
of federal rights).
89. Simpson, 500 F.3d at 1184.
90. Karasek v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 956 F.3d 1093 (9th Cir. 2020).
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harasser and the context in which the known harassment occur[red];” (2)
the alleged harassment must be “so severe, pervasive, and objectively
offensive that it can be said to deprive the [plaintiff] of access to the
educational opportunities or benefits provided by the school;” (3) the
school must have had actual knowledge of the harassment; (4) the
school’s response to the harassment was deliberately indifferent, meaning
it was “clearly unreasonable in light of the known circumstances;” and
(5) that indifferent response must have “cause[d the plaintiff] to undergo
harassment or ma[d]e [the plaintiff] liable or vulnerable to it.”91 The Ninth
Circuit affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of two of the post-assault
claims and the grant of summary judgment in favor of UC on the third,
finding in all three instances that the University’s response was not
deliberately indifferent. The court vacated the lower court’s dismissal of
the pre-assault claim and remanded the case for further proceedings.92
The students alleged that UC “maintained a policy of deliberate
indifference to sexual misconduct,” the result of which was a campus
environment that was hostile to women and an elevated risk that they
would be subject to sexual assault.93 Finding the pre-assault claim to be a
matter of first impression, the court clarified the standard to be applied
and listed the elements necessary to successfully state such a claim under
Title IX:
[A] pre-assault claim should survive a motion to dismiss if the plaintiff
plausibly alleges that (1) a school maintained a policy of deliberate
indifference to reports of sexual misconduct, (2) which created a
heightened risk of sexual harassment that was known or obvious (3) in a
context subject to the school's control, and (4) as a result, the plaintiff
suffered harassment that was “so severe, pervasive, and objectively
offensive that it can be said to [have] deprive[d] the [plaintiff] of access to
the educational opportunities or benefits provided by the school.”94

The court went on to clarify that plaintiffs alleging a pre-assault claim
need not prove that a recipient had actual knowledge or acted with
deliberate indifference for the claim to survive a motion to dismiss—
alleging facts that demonstrate each of the elements above will be
sufficient for the claim to survive.95 The court then looked to the
complaint and found that the facts alleged in this case adequately
supported the plaintiffs’ position. The court rejected UC’s argument that
the students’ allegations must fail because the facts they provided were
significantly more attenuated than those set forth by the plaintiffs in
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id. at 1105 (quoting Davis, 526 U.S. at 645-50).
Id. at 1099.
Id. at 1111-12.
Id. at 1112 (quoting Davis, 526 U.S. at 650).
Id. at 1113.
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Simpson. The court found it dispositive that Simpson involved a motion
for summary judgment rather than a motion to dismiss and held that the
decision as to whether there was the necessary causal link between the
school’s policy of deliberate indifference and the plaintiffs’ harassment
was ultimately one for the district court.96 The court stated that the statute
itself provided adequate protection for recipients because the required
element of causation “ensures that Title IX liability remains within proper
bounds.”97 In other words, the court should afford broad deference to
plaintiff’s allegations when considering motions to dismiss pre-assault
Title IX claims.
Although the Karasek opinion ultimately dismissed the plaintiffs’ postassault claims, the Ninth Circuit’s articulation of the specific elements of
post-and pre-assault claims, as well as their sound analysis of the differing
burdens of proof required depending on the procedural posture of the
case, are useful in analyzing the circuit split that arises in the context of
motions to dismiss post-assault claims.
D. The Current Circuit Split Regarding Post-Assault/Harassment
Claims
The requirements for pleading a post-assault claim sufficient to survive
a motion to dismiss are the subject of a circuit split. The central question
is whether a plaintiff may satisfy the fifth element of a post-assault claim
as stated in Karasek by pleading that the school’s deliberate indifference
made him or her vulnerable to further harassment or assault, even if no
additional incident of misconduct has occurred, or whether a post-assault
claim only survives a motion to dismiss where an actionable incident of
sexual misconduct has occurred and the Title IX injury is attributable to
that post-actual-knowledge incident. Recent opinions from the Sixth and
Tenth Circuits illustrate the circuit split.
1. The Tenth Circuit
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals considered the appropriate
standard in Farmer v. Kansas State University, a 2019 case that reached
the court on an interlocutory appeal from the denial of the university’s
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.98 The court held that a
plaintiff satisfies the pleading requirements for a post-harassment claim
when she/he alleges that a school’s deliberate indifference caused her/him

96. Id. at 1114.
97. Id.
98. Farmer v. Kan. State Univ., 918 F.3d 1094 (10th Cir. 2019).
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to be—at a minimum— vulnerable to further harassment.99 According to
the Tenth Circuit, the Davis Court settled the matter when it answered the
same legal question presented in this case by holding that the school’s
deliberately indifferent response triggered Title IX liability when it
“cause[d] students to undergo harassment or ma[de] them liable or
vulnerable to it.”100
The court pointed out that because the procedural posture of the case
was an interlocutory appeal of the denial of Kansas State University’s
(“KSU”) motion to dismiss, all of the plaintiffs’ factual allegations must
be accepted as true and construed in the light most favorable to the
plaintiffs.101 Therefore, the question before the court was: what harm was
caused by KSU’s alleged deliberate indifference?102 The plaintiffs’ claim
that KSU’s deliberately indifferent response to their separate reports of
rape committed by other students effectively caused them to be denied the
benefits of the educational programs or activities. According to the
plaintiffs, the ongoing possibility of encountering their respective rapists
or other students who knew of the rapes and the school’s indifferent
response caused them to withdraw from, or decline to participate in,
programs and activities at the university, thus resulting in actionable
discrimination by KSU under Title IX.103
Ruling in favor of the plaintiffs, the court considered both the language
of Title IX and the Supreme Court’s opinion in Davis, as well as Title
IX’s objective and purpose. The court found that relevant statutory
language provided that “[n]o person in the United States shall, on the basis
of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance.”104
The Tenth Circuit then considered the Davis Court’s application of the
statute to the student-on-student harassment which resulted in the holding
that “deliberate indifference must, at a minimum, cause [students] to
undergo harassment or make them liable or vulnerable to it.”105
Recognizing the Supreme Court’s disjunctive use of “or” in the final
phrase, the Tenth Circuit insisted that courts must give effect to the entire
sentence, finding the school responsible for either causing a student to
“undergo harassment” or making a student “liable or vulnerable” to it.106

99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Id. at 1109.
Id.at 1097 (quoting Davis, 526 U.S. at 644-45).
Id. at 1097, 1099.
Id. at 1097.
Id. at 1098-99.
Id. at 1103 (quoting 20 U.S.C. §1681(a)) (emphasis added).
Id. (quoting Davis, 526 U.S. at 644-45) (internal quotations deleted).
Id. at 1104.
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The Court looked to the object and purpose of Title IX and found that this
interpretation of the Davis standard aligned with the objective of
“protecting individual students against discriminatory practices.”107
The Tenth Circuit also carefully considered the implications of its
holding; it rejected KSU’s argument that by finding the university liable
for making students vulnerable to sexual harassment, the court was
requiring KSU to provide a remedy for the harm caused by the
perpetrators rather than the university.108 This is especially important
because the Davis Court held that a school was not required to “purg[e]
their schools of actionable peer harassment . . . or engage in particular
disciplinary action.”109 The Tenth Circuit insisted that KSU’s liability
stemmed from the university’s deliberate indifference, which caused its
students to be vulnerable to further harassment.110 That vulnerability, in
turn, amounted to actionable discrimination under Title IX because it
ultimately denied those students the benefits of KSU’s education.111
Finally, the Farmer court explicitly rejected KSU’s attempt to increase
the pleading burden on survivors of student-on-student sexual violence,
finding that requiring a survivor to allege a subsequent act of actionable
harassment was inconsistent with the language of the statute, the Supreme
Court’s articulation of the standard in Davis, and subsequent in- and outof-circuit case law.112 The Tenth Circuit’s interpretation of the Davis
standard stands in stark contrast to a Sixth Circuit opinion issued the same
year.
2. The Sixth Circuit
In Kollaritsch v. Michigan State University, the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals held that the pleading standard for a post-harassment Title IX
claim required that a student survivor allege an additional incident of
actionable sexual harassment before a school could be found liable under
the deliberate indifference standard.113 The case arose as an interlocutory
appeal from a partial denial of Michigan State’s motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim on facts similar to those in Farmer.114 Despite the
similarities, the Sixth Circuit arrived at a very different conclusion, both
procedurally and substantively.
107. Id. (quoting Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 704 (1979)).
108. Id.
109. Davis v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 650 (1999).
110. Farmer, 918 F.3d at 1105.
111. Id. at 1106.
112. Id. at 1108.
113. Kollaritsch v. Mich. State Univ. Bd. of Trs., 944 F.3d 613 (6th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 141
S. Ct. 554 (2020).
114. Id. at 618.
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Procedurally, the court noted that because this case arose as an
interlocutory appeal from the denial of a motion to dismiss, it was not
governed under the standard of review expressed in Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6) and was instead limited to pure questions of law as
well as any issue encompassed by the order certifying the appeal.115 The
court then relied on this “any issue” language as permission to consider
the facts contained in the plaintiffs’ pleading, rather than following
Supreme Court and other Circuit precedent that require the facts be taken
as true and construed in the plaintiff’s favor even in interlocutory
appeals.116 As a result, the Kollaritsch court arrived at a different central
question than the Tenth Circuit, despite similar facts and procedural
posture.
The Sixth Circuit found that the relevant question of law turned not on
what harm was caused by the school’s alleged deliberate indifference but
rather on “whether a plaintiff must plead further acts of discrimination”
to state a claim for deliberate indifference to student-on-student
harassment under Title IX in the first place.117 To answer this question,
the court began with the premise that the Davis standard encompassed
two separate tortious acts: an act of student-on-student harassment
sufficient to trigger Title IX and a separate tort of deliberate indifference
to that act by the school—which caused the student survivor to experience
an additional act of sexual harassment.118 In order to arrive at this
conclusion, the Sixth Circuit painstakingly parsed each element of each
tort.119 Relevant for this Casenote are the court’s interpretation of the
pervasive element of the student-on-student harassment and the causation
and injury elements of the tort of deliberate indifference.
In considering how to apply pervasive in the context of student-onstudent harassment, the Sixth Circuit relied on dicta from the Davis Court
that indicated the Court thought it “unlikely” that Congress would have
thought that a single act of harassment could have a systemic effect, even
though the Court simultaneously conceded that a single instance, if
sufficiently severe “could be said to have such an effect.”120 Dismissing
the latter statement, the Sixth Circuit used the former to support its theory
that an additional incident of harassment, beyond the initial harassment
that triggered Title IX, was necessary to sufficiently state a claim for
deliberate indifference, because a single assault “does not state a claim

115. Id.
116. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); In
re Text Messaging Antitrust Litig., 630 F.3d 622 (7th Cir. 2010).
117. Kollaritsch, 944 F.3d at 620.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 620-23.
120. Id. at 620 (quoting Davis, 526 U.S. at 652).
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under Davis.”121
In regard to deliberate indifference, the court identified the requisite
injury as some sort of denial or abridgement of the educational
opportunities or programs provided by the school.122 The harm suffered
by the student in Davis who reported declining grades, trouble
concentrating, and fear of attending school, as well as similar harms
suffered by a student in a Sixth Circuit case were cited as examples by the
court.123 The court also stated, without accompanying authority, that
emotional harm on its own is not sufficient to trigger Title IX liability.124
Moving on to causation, the Sixth Circuit found that the “critical point”
in Davis is that deliberate indifference is only actionable when it either
“brings about” or “fails to protect against” further harassment.125
However, rather than relying on the plain-meaning and ordinary rules of
grammar to interpret “deliberate indifference must, at a minimum, cause
[students] to undergo harassment or make them liable or vulnerable to
it,”126 the court found that the standard merely listed two ways a school’s
deliberate indifference could cause further harassment.127 The first way
would be by some sort of detrimental action such as encouraging or
prompting further harassment and the second would be by not acting and
thus leaving the student survivor unprotected from further harassment.128
The Sixth Circuit explicitly stated that “vulnerable to” sexual harassment
had the same meaning as “unprotected from” it and thus the only student
survivors who could state a deliberate indifference claim sufficient to
withstand a motion to dismiss were those who suffered an initial act of
student-on-student harassment and an additional act.129
Finally, the Kollaritsch court differed procedurally from the Tenth
Circuit decision in Farmer because the Sixth Circuit did not accept the
plaintiffs’ allegations as true. Instead, the court found that, despite one
student survivor’s claims of nine separate incidents of “stalking,
harassing, and intimidating” by the perpetrator, she failed to plead an
additional incident of sexual harassment and therefore could not satisfy
the causation element of her deliberate indifference claim.130 Ultimately,
the Kollaritsch decision articulates a broader standard than the one in
Davis. According to the Sixth Circuit:
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Id. at 621, 623.
Id. at 622.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Davis, 526 U.S. 629, 644-45 (1999).
Kollaritsch, 944 F.3d at 623.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 625.
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The plaintiff must plead . . . an incident of actionable sexual harassment,
the school’s actual knowledge of it, some further incident of actionable
sexual harassment, that the further actionable harassment would not have
happened but for the objective unreasonableness (deliberate indifference)
of the school’s response, and that the Title IX injury is attributable to the
post-actual knowledge harassment.131

The Eighth and Ninth Circuits join the Sixth Circuit in setting a high
bar for deliberate indifference pleadings,132 while the First and Eleventh
Circuits join the Tenth in holding that a showing of subsequent
vulnerability to harassment is sufficient to state a claim that a school’s
deliberately indifferent response violated the student’s rights by denying
the student the benefits of the school’s education or programs.133
III. DISCUSSION
This Part will present several arguments for why courts should adopt
the broader standard set forth by the Tenth Circuit and discuss
shortcomings of the Sixth Circuit opinion that render the application of
such a narrow standard legally incorrect and in contradiction to remedial
purpose of Title IX. First, the procedural rules and case law regarding
motions to dismiss support a more inclusive standard. In addition, the
rules of statutory interpretation lend support to the Tenth Circuit opinion
and expose flaws in the Sixth Circuit’s result. Finally, the combination of
the new Title IX rules and a strict pleading standard would set the bar too
high for student survivors at the pleading stage, effectively denying them
an equitable opportunity for legal remedy.
A. The Procedural Rules and Case Law Support the More Inclusive
Standard
In order to survive a motion to dismiss, a court must accept a plaintiff’s

131. Id.
132. KT v. Culver-Stockton College, 865 F.3d 1054, 1058 (8th Cir. 2017) (finding that the plaintiff
failed to prove that the school’s response caused her assault and therefore she failed to state a claim);
Reese v. Jefferson Sch. Dist. No. 14J, 208 F.3d 736, 740 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that a lack of evidence
that any harassment occurred after the school district learned of the plaintiffs' allegations meant that, under
Davis, the school district cannot be deemed to have “subjected” the plaintiffs to the harassment).
133. Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Comm., 504 F.3d 165, 172–73 (1st Cir. 2007), rev’d on other
grounds, 555 U.S. 246 (2009) (holding that “a single instance of peer-on-peer harassment could sustain a
claim for liability under Title IX if the incident was severe and the institution’s deliberately indifferent
response resulted in the student being denied access to a scholastic program or activity); Williams v. Bd.
of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., 477 F.3d 1282, 1297 (11th Cir. 2007) (finding the university’s deliberately
indifferent response to plaintiff’s report of sexual assault rendered her decision to withdraw from
university reasonable and expected and thus the deliberate indifference denied her the opportunity to
continue to attend UGA, subjecting her to discrimination under Title IX).
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allegations as true, and construe all facts in the plaintiff’s favor.134
Importantly, this standard is based on plausibility, not probability, and is
applied to interlocutory appeals as well as appeals from final
judgments.135 As the Seventh Circuit stated when applying the pleading
standard to an interlocutory appeal in an antitrust case, “the case is just at
the complaint stage and the test for whether to dismiss a case at that stage
turns on the complaint’s plausibility.”136 Appropriate deference to this
pleading standard and to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure validates
the Tenth Circuit opinion and casts doubt upon the Sixth Circuit’s.
The Tenth Circuit appropriately acknowledged the procedural posture
of the case, recognizing that even in the context of an interlocutory appeal
from a motion to dismiss for failure to statute a claim, the plaintiffs were
entitled to the standard expressed in Twombly and Iqbal. Therefore, rather
than questioning the facts, the court and the parties accepted them as true
and construed them in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs.137 As a
result of a de facto finding of plausibility regarding KSU’s deliberate
indifference, the Farmer court focused its legal analysis on the proper
legal question: what harm resulted from the school’s deliberate
indifference?138 This allowed the court to undertake a straightforward
interpretation of the statute and the Davis holding, apply the law to the
facts, and arrive at a conclusion that is supported by the statute’s text and
purpose and Supreme Court precedent.
By contrast, the Sixth Circuit’s failure to abide by the pleading standard
set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 and interpreted by Twombly
and Iqbal led them astray, resulting in a standard that is excessively
narrow and an opinion that is ambiguous at best.139 The key difference
between the Farmer and Kollaritsch decisions is what question the court
claimed as the central issue in the case. By ignoring the applicable
pleading standard and inferring the facts alleged in the defendant’s favor,
the Sixth Circuit arrived at the wrong question, focusing on whether
Michigan State’s response was, in fact, deliberately indifferent, rather
than inferring from the facts provided that it was. This question stops short
134. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). See also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 684 (2009) (extending the Rule 8 pleading standard set forth in Twombly to civil actions); Fed. R.
Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
135. See In re Text Messaging Antitrust Litig., 630 F.3d 622, 625 (7th Cir. 2010) (allowing an
interlocutory appeal regarding the sufficiency the Plaintiff’s complaint to proceed because Defendant’s
were asking the court to apply the pleading standard from Twombly to a set of factual allegations taken as
true on appeal).
136. Id. at 629 (internal quotation marks omitted).
137. Farmer v. Kan. State Univ., 918 F.3d 1094, 1097, 1099 (10th Cir. 2019)..
138. Id. at 1097.
139. HARVARD LAW REVIEW, Sixth Circuit Requires Further Harassment in Deliberate
Indifference Claims, 133 HARV. L. REV. 2611 (June 10, 2020), https://harvardlawreview.org
/2020/06/kollaritsch-v-michigan-state-university-board-of-trustees/.

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2022

21

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 90, Iss. 3 [2022], Art. 8

2022]

THE TITLE IX PENDULUM

1015

of considering the actual question in cases where parties seek to recover
from the school itself in Title IX cases: whether the school’s action—or
inaction—in response to a known incident of sexual harassment subjected
the student survivor to discrimination by ultimately preventing him or her
from participating in the school’s educational programs or activities.
Following this initial procedural misstep, the court reasoned that
discrimination resulting from the school’s deliberate indifference could
not exist in the absence of an additional discrete act of sexual harassment
or assault. In other words, the Sixth Circuit was focused on actions of
third parties, rather than the actions of the university itself. However, as
the Farmer decision clearly illustrates, the discrimination at issue in Title
IX student-on-student harassment cases arising under claims of deliberate
indifference is whether the school discriminated against the student
survivor by effectively denying him or her access to its educational
programs, not whether an additional act of harassment by a third party
occurred.140 In order to sustain its opinion to the contrary, the Sixth Circuit
resorted to a convoluted reading of the Davis decision that defied the rules
of statutory interpretation and created an additional element required to
sustain a claim of deliberate indifference—an element that neither the
statute nor the Davis opinion require.
B. The Rules of Statutory Construction Support the Broader Definition
of Post-Harassment
Chief Justice John Marshall recognized early in America’s judicial
history, that “[t]hose who apply the rule [of law] to particular cases must
of necessity expound and interpret that rule.”141 The rules of statutory
construction aid judges in that process. However, the canons of
construction are many, and as a result, are not a panacea to problems of
interpretation; one can generally find an opposing canon to refute any
point argued.142 An appropriate resolution of opposing canons involves
the courts’ exercising discretion over which interpretation of the statute
should be afforded more weight.143
One of the fundamental principles guiding the interpretation of modern
legal instruments is that text should be interpreted in a way that “furthers
rather than obstructs the document’s purpose.”144 This is particularly
relevant for statutes like Title IX that concern protections for civil rights.
140. Supra, Section II.
141. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
142. ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN GARDNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL
TEXTS 68 (2012).
143. Id.
144. Id. at 70.
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According to the Supreme Court, civil rights laws and other remedial
statutes “must be liberally construed in conformance with [their] purpose,
and in a way which avoids harsh and incongruous results.”145 In Gebser,
the Supreme Court noted that Congress enacted Title IX to provide
individual citizens protection from discrimination by institutions
receiving federal funding, creating what the Court characterized as a
contract that conditioned federal funding on a promise by the recipient
not to discriminate.146 Therefore, Title IX is, at bottom, a remedial statute
whose purpose is to prevent discrimination. Any valid interpretation of
the statute must conform with this purpose and avoid contrary results.
The canon of imputed common law counsels that words that are
undefined (in Davis, the phrase “liable or vulnerable to”) are to be
interpreted and applied as they would be at common law.147 In an effort
to fill the interpretive gap left by the Davis decision, the Sixth Circuit
tacitly invoked this canon by imputing the elements of the common law
torts and the but-for causation standard commonly associated with tort
law into Title IX claims.148 However, this canon is meant to add clarity to
single words or phrases and does not support the wholesale import of an
entire common law tort with all of its attendant elements and causation
standards. Furthermore, importing common-law tort principles into civil
rights statutes is problematic for two reasons, both of which are evident
here. First, anti-discrimination statutes are not generally element-specific
on their face and thus it is incongruent to arbitrarily impose tort law’s
elements-based analysis.149 And, second, importing tort principles, as the
Sixth Circuit does here, can frustrate the original purpose of the statute.150
The result in Kollaritsch is a post-assault standard that is blatantly
contradictory to Title IX’s remedial purpose because it conditions a
student survivor’s ability to access the judicial system on enduring not
one, but two incidents of sexual harassment.
In seeking to balance conflicting results arrived at by the application of
different canons, courts should recall that the judicially sound outcome
“seeks to discern literal meaning in context.”151 Here, the Tenth Circuit
145. Voris v. Eikel, 346 U.S. 328, 333 (1953). See also Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, 396 U.S.
229, 237 (1969) (“A narrow construction of §1982 would be inconsistent with the broad and sweeping
nature of the protection meant to be afforded by §1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866.”); Northeast Marine
Terminal v. Caputo, 432 U.S. 249, 268 (1977) (“The language of the 1972 Amendments [to the LHWCA]
is broad and suggests that we should take an expansive view of the extended coverage. Indeed, such a
construction is appropriate for this remedial legislation.”).
146. Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 286 (1989) (emphasis added).
147. SCALIA & GARDNER, supra note 142, at 246.
148. Supra Section II.
149. HARVARD LAW REVIEW, supra note 139; see also Sandra F. Sperino, Let's Pretend
Discrimination Is a Tort, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 1107, 1109 (2014).
150. HARVARD LAW REVIEW, supra note 139.
151. SCALIA & GARDNER, supra note 142, at 53.
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decision relies on the plain meaning of the text and ordinary grammatical
rules to arrive at an application of the Davis decision that is in accord with
the stated purpose of the statute and “avoids harsh and incongruous
results.”152 By contrast, the Sixth Circuit opinion misapplies a narrow
canon of construction, impermissibly imports a conflicting area of the
law, and arrives at an unjust result that frustrates Title IX’s purpose of
protecting individuals who are denied participation in a school’s
educational programs or activities as a direct result of the school’s actions.
C. The Combination of the Sixth Circuit’s Interpretation and the New
Title IX Rules Sets the Bar Too High for Survivors
The post-assault standard articulated by the Kollaritsch court standing
alone makes it extremely difficult for student survivors to find recourse
for their school’s deliberately indifferent response under Title IX, even at
the pleading stage. When combined with the new Title IX regulations,
that bar becomes impossibly high and frustrates the purpose for which
Title IX was enacted. Recent scholarship, public policy, and even
decisions made by the Department of Education in promulgating the new
Title IX regulations all support the more inclusive pleading standard.
Ironically, the Sixth Circuit opinion expressly notes the high bar
student survivors must meet to prevail on a deliberate indifference
claim.153 And the Ninth Circuit implicitly recognizes that bar when it
insists that plaintiffs need not prove sufficient facts to survive a motion to
dismiss when the case has only progressed as far as the pleading stage.154
Recent scholarship published by the advocacy group Know Your IX
details additional barriers for survivors caused by simply reporting the
assault to their schools.155 Notably, the very act of reporting substantially
disrupted the education of thirty-nine percent of survivors.156 The types
of harm that resulted in discrimination due to the resulting denial of access
to their school’s education program were the same harms alleged by the

152. Voris v. Eikel, 346 U.S. 328 (1953).
153. Kollaritsch v. Mich. State Univ. Bd. of Trs., 944 F.3d 613, 619 (6th Cir. 2019) ( “[A] Title IX
private cause of action against a school for its response to student-on-student sexual harassment is a ‘high
standard’ that applies only ‘in certain limited circumstances.’”).
154. Karasek v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 956 F.3d 1093, 1114 (9th Cir. 2020) (distinguishing
Karasek from Simpson because the procedural posture of the latter was an appeal from a motion for
summary judgment and thus discovery had been conducted; appellants in a 12(b)(6) motion need only
“plausibly allege . . . a policy of deliberate indifference.”).
155. Sarah Nesbitt et al., The Cost of Reporting: Perpetrator Retaliation, Institutional Betrayal,
and Student Survivor Pushout, KNOW YOUR IX (March 2021), https://www.knowyourix.org/wpcontent/uploads/2021/03/Know-Your-IX-2021-Report-Final-Copy.pdf.
156. Id. at 1.
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plaintiffs in both Farmer and Kollaritsch.157
As discussed above, the codification of the severe, pervasive, and
objectively offensive standard in the new regulations further increases
barriers to recourse for student survivors. Similarly, the actual notice
standard for Title IX claims has been officially codified in the new
regulations, eliminating the constructive notice standard of “knew or
should have known” that informed the now-withdrawn guidance
documents from the Obama administration, which arguably set the bar
higher for a school’s response. Now, a school will only be held liable for
a Title IX violation, including a deliberately indifferent response, upon a
showing that a school official “with authority to institute corrective
measures on the school’s behalf” had actual knowledge of the harassment
or assault.158 These compounding barriers, combined with the standard
articulated by Kollaritsch, arguably discriminate against student survivors
by acting as an almost complete bar to remedy, precluding the facts
supporting their allegations from even being heard.
Ironically, the new Title IX regulations also lend some support to doing
away with the Kollaritsch standard. First, the 2020 regulations expressly
incorporate the crimes included in the Clery Act and the Violence Against
Women Act. Any sexual assault, dating violence, domestic violence, or
stalking as defined by either the federal Clery Act159 or the Violence
Against Women Act160 constitutes actionable sexual harassment.
According to the Department of Education, it is unnecessary to show
severity, pervasiveness, or objective offensiveness in regard to these acts
because sanctioning them does not implicate the First Amendment and
they inherently deny victims access to equal education.161 Thus, the DOE
further undermines the Sixth Circuit opinion by expressly acknowledging
that a single act of sexual harassment can be sufficient to state a claim
under Title IX.162 Notably, the complaint that allegedly failed to state a
claim in Kollaritsch included nine reports of stalking subsequent to
Michigan State’s deliberately indifferent response and, under the new
rules, would therefore survive a motion to dismiss even if the “severe,
pervasive, and objectively offensive” standard was not met.
157. Id. at 5. For example, declining grades, panic attacks, leaves of absence, transfers to new
schools, and drop outs.
158. OFF. FOR CIV. RTS., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., Summary of Major Provisions of the Department
of Education’s Title IX Final Rule, http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/titleix-summary.pdf.
159. Jeanne Clery Disclosure of Campus Security Policy and Campus Crime Statistics Act of 1990,
20 U.S.C. § 1092(f) (2018).
160. Violence Against Women Act, 34 U.S.C.A. §12361 (West).
161. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities Receiving Federal
Financial Assistance, 85 Fed. Reg. 30026, 30029, 30033 (May 19, 2020) (codified at 34 C.F.R. Part 106).
162. Id. at 30172 (“[F]ailing to provide redress for even a single incident . . . does present
unnecessary risk of allowing sex-based violence to escalate”).
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The new regulations also expressly acknowledge that critical use of the
disjunctive “or” in the text and application of Title IX, doing away with
it in the definition of what constitutes sexual harassment in the first place
by changing the language from “severe, pervasive, or objectively
offensive” to “severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive.”163 Since the
new regulations adopt the Supreme Court’s conjunctive definition from
Davis, the DOE is clearly endorsing the Court’s use of the conjunctive
“and.” It stands to reason then, that the DOE must also be supportive of
the disjunctive “or” used later in the same opinion in the context of a
school’s deliberate indifference.
Finally, the new rules provide enhanced due process protections for the
alleged perpetrators of sexual assault or harassment, decreasing the
likelihood that the rights of students accused, but not yet found guilty of,
sexual harassment will be abridged as the result of Title IX actions. These
additional protections militate against setting the pleading bar so high for
survivors, particularly in deliberate indifference cases which, when
properly considered, implicate the school, not the alleged perpetrator.
Should any doubt remain as to whether the Sixth Circuit “got it right,”
it is worth noting one fact the court left out of its opinion: the perpetrator
of the assault on the second plaintiff was the same student the school
failed to discipline as a result of Kollaritsch’s initial report, and the same
student who Kollaritsch alleged stalked her subsequent to the school’s
response. The application of the higher pleading standard unjustly denied
the Kollaritsch plaintiffs a remedy afforded to them under Title IX.
Equally importantly, it allowed Michigan State University to escape
liability for its actions that had a discriminatory effect on students and
perpetuated a dangerous environment on campus. The net result is
precisely the one Title IX was enacted to prevent: Michigan State suffered
no consequence despite the fact it breached its contract with the federal
government by continuing to accept federal funding while discriminating
against its student survivors.
IV. CONCLUSION
This Casenote demonstrates how student survivors of sexual assault
and harassment are at the mercy of the Title IX pendulum swings created
by the interplay of legislation, regulation, judicial interpretation,
presidential policy, and shifting political landscapes. The Sixth Circuit
decision reveals the ugly and unsettling cost of this ride on the pendulum.
Meanwhile, the Tenth Circuit decision illustrates how a faithful
application of the regulations and Supreme Court precedent in the context

163. Id. at 30034.
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of Title’s IX remedial purpose results in a decision closely aligned with
Title IX’s text, object, and purpose, provides a more predictable legal
outcome for all parties, and ensures that student survivors are afforded all
available legal remedies. Absent further Congressional legislation or an
additional Supreme Court opinion that mitigates the pendulum’s swing,
the lower courts should follow the Tenth Circuit’s example.
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